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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

TEACHING ELECTION LAW TO POLITICAL SCIENTISTS

BRUCE E. CAIN*
INTRODUCTION
The modern incarnation of election law is a cross-pollinated field in
several senses. Although there was at least one earlier Election Law
casebook1, the field really blossomed after Baker v. Carr.2 Because the Court
essentially lowered (some might say abandoned) the threshold for judicial
involvement in “political questions,”3 state and federal courts at many levels
became players in the reform arena. The Court’s new openness to playing
referee and last resort line-drawer in redistricting cases coincided with a
parallel flurry of post-Watergate reform activity in the areas of campaign
finance, transparency, and lobbying that was nurtured by the political
incentives of divided government in the 1970s.4 The struggle over the
meaning and implementation of these efforts spilled into the courts. As the
push for political reform continues, the volume of litigation swells also, adding
ever more cases to the Election Law curriculum.
Political scientists were drawn into election law because many of the legal
determinations hinged on empirical facts:5 (for example, measurements of
racial polarization levels, the impact of political funding patterns on legislation
and elections, and the size of the residual vote in election administration
disputes). Political regulation, however, also intersects with the study of
government in other ways. Although it has not always been so clear to either
political scientists or legal scholars, election law draws on democratic theory

* Heller Professor of Political Science and Executive Director of the University of California
Washington Center in Washington, D.C.
1. See Daniel H. Lowenstein, Election Law as a Subject—A Subjective Account, 32 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1199, 1201–02 (1999) (citing FREDERICK C. BRIGHTLY, A COLLECTION OF
LEADING CASES ON THE LAW OF ELECTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (1871)).
2. 369 U.S. 186 (1962); see Richard L. Hasen, Introduction: Election Law at Puberty:
Optimism and Words of Caution, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1095, 1099–1100 (1999).
3. Baker, 369 U.S. at 209–11.
4. See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat.
1267 (1974).
5. I discuss this further in Bruce E. Cain, Election Law as a Field: A Political Scientist’s
Perspective, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1105, 1118–19 (1999).
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as much as empirical findings, as reformers frequently invoke high-minded
goals such as equality of representation or political legitimacy to justify their
proposals.
To his credit, Professor Lowenstein was the earliest proponent of a
legal/political science partnership. This was reflected from the beginning in
his casebook, Election Law, by the inclusion of political science materials
along with the cases themselves and attending commentary notes.6 I audited
his Election Law course in the eighties to learn more about the law, and was
pleasantly surprised and impressed by the way he related materials from the
two disciplines to give background to the cases and to frame their meaning for
the political system. At the time, since redistricting was the biggest topic in
election law, a number of political scientists—myself, Bernie Grofman, Dick
Engstrom—were involved as expert witnesses in political and racial
redistricting cases. Daniel Lowenstein himself had hands-on election law
experience as the first Chair of the Fair Political Practices Commission.7 So
from the onset, Election Law was also cross-pollinated in a second sense,
combining practitioners and scholars. Despite different backgrounds and
training, it meant that the lawyers and political scientists shared some common
experiences with cases and disputes. The Law and Politics group of the
American Political Science Association (“APSA”) and the Election Law
Journal have fostered these cross-pollinations self-consciously.
But teaching Election Law to political scientists remains a challenge,
outside of the growing but still limited number of joint Ph.D.-J.D. scholars the
field is currently producing. The joint degree phenomenon is a welcome
development in many ways, but it is not a practical way to educate the many
other political scientists, or for that matter, lawyers whose work will touch on
election law issues, or the many undergraduates who could profit by
understanding the constitutional framework for political regulation. A truly
cross-disciplinary approach to teaching Election Law must expose the law or
political science student to the framework of the other discipline. That is not a
simple matter, but also not impossible.
In this short Essay, I will elaborate on some of the challenges of teaching
Election Law across disciplinary boundaries, and recommend some guidelines
gleaned from my own teaching experiences. In the end, I believe that
Lowenstein’s basic dual approach is the best, but it involves trading off some
of the depth and technicality usually involved in graduate training. But cross-

6. See DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN & RICHARD L. HASEN, ELECTION LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS xviii (3d ed. 2004) (discussing the interdisciplinary nature of the textbook).
7. Daniel Hays Lowenstein: Biography, UCLA SCH. LAW, http://www.law.ucla.edu/facul
ty/all-faculty-profiles/emeritiprofessors/Pages/daniel-hays-lowenstein.aspx (last visited Feb. 23,
2012).
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disciplinary exposure might promote a deeper view about regulatory strategy
and doctrines.
I. CROSSING THE DISCIPLINARY DIVIDE
Social scientists and lawyers are trained to think differently. Political
scientists look to identify patterns and causes, testing theories with data and
focusing on the central tendencies rather than dwelling on the specifics of
individual cases. What political scientists cannot explain as a statistical
regularity falls into an error term that is commonly assumed to consist of
random factors. Legal thinking elevates elements of the error term to a higher
level of importance; a particular case fact or nuance can make all the difference
between decisions falling one way or the other. In theory, and sometimes in
practice, these complementary perspectives can work in a symbiotic fashion.
Political scientists and legal scholars also draw on different literatures
when they look at election law problems. The former will know a lot about the
relevant empirical literature or theories of representation, but little or nothing
about the court rulings or related law review commentary. A few years ago,
one of my distinguished peers gave a featured talk about campaign finance
reform at the annual APSA meeting, urging the political science community to
advocate for curbing independent spending by the political parties and
enforcing mandatory public financing to restore political competition, unaware
at the time of the legal constraints on his ideas. He was quite surprised when I
told him that many of his ideas were likely unconstitutional.
I was reminded of this divide at a recent Law and Politics dinner that
placed me at the same table with several young election law scholars. The
political scientists enthusiastically described at length game theoretic models
of political competition and multivariate equations that explained the
measurable effects of Citizens United.8 At the other end of the table sat a
former Yale Law Journal Editor and Supreme Court Clerk writing about the
different venue options in redistricting cases. As they described their work to
one another, I wondered how much each understood and appreciated what the
other was doing. If the election law field is going to thrive, they will need to.
When I have taught from the leading Election Law casebooks to political
science graduate students, I have found that they get impatient at wading
through all the case detail even though, of course, the cases are substantially
edited. Many of them lack the rudimentary foundations in constitutional law
and need to be given some instruction on legal concepts such as strict scrutiny,
compelling state interests, and narrowly tailored remedies in order to
understand the Court’s way of thinking about the constitutionality of different
political reforms. But if you can quell the political science graduate students’

8. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
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initial rebellion, they come to see that the courts deal with fascinating
problems, and that what looks simple and easy to generalize from five miles up
in the quantitative intellectual skies, looks perplexing and complicated at the
legal ground level. Having a mixed class of lawyers and political scientists is
useful in that regard, because I can turn to the law students to get a reliable
distillation of the cases whereas the political scientists tend to get overwhelmed
by the story and sometimes miss the bottom line significance of what they are
reading. Too many law students can also be a problem because they tend to
dominate the legal discussion, being more at home with case materials.
Problems arise in the other direction, of course, when attention turns to the
relevant empirical findings. As in economics, the technical barriers to political
science research have risen, and people who wield these methodological
hammers like to dwell on the minutiae of their applications or the possibility of
applying alternative and usually ever more sophisticated techniques. It would
be helpful if lawyers contemplating a career in election law would take
elementary statistics courses just as it would be better for the political scientists
to take Constitutional Law, but neither handicap is fatal. The important
takeaway is an understanding of the basic research design and bottom line
findings. Which estimation procedure is used and why is most often a
secondary or tertiary issue.
To achieve the dual goals of helping the law students understand how
political science research is conducted and not overwhelming them at the same
time, I try to include both empirical studies and overview articles. My favorite
empirical articles for the purpose of demonstrating the empirical method are
those that try to measure the impact of campaign money on election outcomes
and policy.9 They nicely illustrate how simple intuitions (for example, money
obviously corrupts) can be misleading (donations typically go to those who are
already supporters and evidence of influences on votes are clearer with
narrower, technical issues).10 They also illustrate such issues as two-way
causation and the need to look over time, as well as cross-sectional data.11
Increasingly there are nice overviews of literatures, some of which have been
done by legal scholars. These are better for a macroscopic look at the
literature.

9. Some of these literatures are vast and have conflicting results. It is helpful to find
articles that sift through the various studies such as Douglas D. Roscoe & Shannon Jenkins, A
Meta-Analysis of Campaign Contributions’ Impact on Roll Call Voting, 86 SOC. SCI. Q. 52
(2005).
10. See, e.g., W. P. Welch, Campaign Contributions and Legislative Voting: Milk Money
and Dairy Price Supports, 35 W. POL. Q. 478 (1982).
11. One of the first and still classic discussions of the two way causation problem, which
when corrected leads to different results, is Gary C. Jacobson, The Effects of Campaign Spending
in Congressional Elections, 72 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 469 (1978).
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A more fundamental divide is between the different norms of inquiry in
legal scholarship and social science. For the social scientist, the prevailing
professional ethos is the impartial pursuit of facts, updating and altering
theories in a Bayesian manner as the weight of evidence builds in one direction
or the other. For the lawyer, evidence is assessed in an adversarial framework,
highlighting confirming evidence and downplaying disconfirming evidence.
Arguments in a legal brief are often lined up like supplicants in a royal court.
If the judge does not accept the first one, he or she is asked to consider another,
even if it is inconsistent with the first.
This can be a serious problem for those political scientists who agree to be
an expert witness. “Coaching” sessions before depositions or trial testimony
can be tense as social science experts, by training and instinct, want to tell
judges everything they know about a given subject, while the lawyers try to
keep them harnessed within the core arguments. Social science research
articles are meant to assess empirical evidence dispassionately, and journal
referees are all too eager to punish by rejection those who claim more than
they have truly proved. The hedged conclusions that finally appear in these
articles can come back to haunt the expert witness, which makes the whole
judicial activity seem even more harrowing.
Another critical difference between legal and political science is the
greater comfort legal scholars have with moving from the empirical to the
normative or vice versa. Not particularly to our credit as a field, political
science has largely quarantined normative discussion to the subfield of
“Political Theory,” and much of that enterprise is about writing intellectual
history rather than creating new concepts. Most empirical studies are
motivated by an opportunity to advance the literature, such as a new way to
measure or conceptualize a previous finding or conventional generalization.
Normative considerations, if they make it to print at all, are tacked onto the end
of the article, almost as a chagrined afterthought. Deriving empirical questions
from normative questions or policy debates is less frequent and garners fewer
professional rewards.
Legal scholarship is much more normative and policy-oriented to begin
with, and more likely than a political science article to take the broader, more
synthetic view. I once gave a lecture on the Voting Rights Act to social
scientists at a prestigious neighboring research university that was greeted with
astonishment because a section of my talk discussed the law’s normative value
as opposed to purely looking at related behavioral issues. Undergraduate
students are more comfortable with this unholy mix, because they have not yet
been trained to think otherwise or socialized to feel guilty when they stray
from what can be rigorously measured towards the “squishier” questions of
justice or fairness.
Political science’s failure in this regard has opened up opportunities for
other fields. Policy schools have assumed this chore with respect to
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government programs and budgeting. Legal scholars have filled the gap on
institutional design as evidenced by the work of Ned Foley, Dan Tokaji, and
Richard Hasen on election administration,12 Heather Gerken on democracy
assessments,13 and Rick Pildes and Sam Issacharoff on political competition14
(just to cite a few examples). I hope that the Election Law classes that I teach
encourage political scientists to loosen their professional straightjacket just a
bit, and engage in these types of questions more often in the future.
II. SILO-ING AND THE COHERENCE OF THE ELECTION LAW FIELD
As academic fields develop, scholars inevitably choose to specialize more.
Expertise extends vertically as the requirements of understanding and
contributing to a subject grow with each new case and scholarly article. This
trend is quite apparent in political science, as evidenced by the number of new
officially recognized APSA subfields.15 Coupled with the lack of professional
incentives to look across subjects in a synthetic way, academic specialties tend
to grow apart like solar systems in an expanding universe. To their credit, the
political scientists and legal scholars in the election law field to date have
tended to work in several subject areas. But it is not clear whether there is any
framework that pulls this all together. To put it another way, how do we
convey to students that Election Law is anything other than a collection of
election-related cases that have been decided by the Supreme Court?
In my approach, I have tried to place Election Law within the larger
context of political reform and regulation. Narrowly conceived, Election Law
covers only the disputes over political regulations and institutions that happen
to be decided by the courts, whereas the entire political reform spectrum
includes all legislative, direct democracy, and constitutional attempts at
democratic improvement. Court rulings and logic have dramatically shaped
U.S. political efforts at reform. The fact, for instance, that an appearance of
quid pro quo corruption, but not political inequity, is a valid compelling state
purpose that justifies important political speech and association rights

12. E.g., Edward B. Foley, The Analysis and Mitigation of Electoral Errors: Theory,
Practice, Policy, 18 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 350 (2007); Richard L. Hasen, Beyond the Margin of
Litigation: Reforming U.S. Election Administration to Avoid Electoral Meltdown, 62 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 937 (2005); Daniel P. Tokaji, Leave it to the Lower Courts: On Judicial Intervention
in Election Administration, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1065 (2007).
13. E.g., HEATHER K. GERKEN, THE DEMOCRACY INDEX: WHY OUR ELECTION SYSTEM IS
FAILING AND HOW TO FIX IT (2009).
14. E.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of
the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643 (1998); Richard H. Pildes, The Theory of Political
Competition, 85 VA. L. REV. 1605 (1999).
15. See APSA Organized Sections, AM. POL. SCI. ASS’N., http://www.apsanet.org/content_
4596.cfm (last visited Feb. 23, 2012).
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limitations16 has both limited the range of options open to political reformers
and incentivized campaign finance advocates to reframe as many democratic
harms as they plausibly can as “corrupt.” This may explain to some degree
why the public believes corruption is rampant in government, even though
politics is by any conceivable measure less corrupt than it used to be.17
But causation flows in the other direction—from the political system to the
courts—as well.
Constitutional conventions are for political reasons
essentially no longer viable pathways for political reform in the modern era.18
Groups are sophisticated venue shoppers, avoiding forums that will lead to
likely defeat and opting for those with a higher prospect for success. As a
consequence, state courts are seeing more amendments to state constitutions
that test the boundaries of the revision doctrine that was meant to protect
against fundamental rule changes motivated by political advantage. It is
important for Election Law students to see the influence and pressures that
both flow into and emanate from the courts, and not view Election Law as
isolated judicial doctrine.
Moreover, Election Law strictly conceived only touches on the front end of
representation—that is, the selection of elected officials—and relegates the
back end to legislative law. Topics like lobbying reform, conflict of interest
regulation, and open meeting laws are not strictly speaking about elections.
But lobbyists often chair fund-raising committees and bundle individual
contributions for elected officials. Conflict of interest logic has seeped into the
approaches that reforms like McCain-Feingold have taken to campaign
finance.19 And transparency expands on all fronts for similar democratic
justifications. There are sensible reasons to divide the labor between the
electoral and legislative realms, but this disconnection is increasingly
problematic in an era of continuous partisan contestation, in which electoral
and legislative strategies are commonly fused. This is yet another advantage of
putting the field in the broader political science framework of political
regulation.

16. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 904–05 (2010) (reaffirming that
political inequity is not a compelling state interest); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976)
(holding that preventing the appearance of corruption can be a compelling state interest).
17. See Richard Morin & Claudia Deane, In Abramoff Case, Most See Evidence of Wider
Problem, WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 2006, at A07.
18. See Bruce E. Cain & Roger G. Noll, Malleable Constitutions: Reflections on State
Constitutional Reform, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1517, 1520 (2009).
19. Bruce E. Cain, More or Less: Searching for Regulatory Balance, in RACE, REFORM,
AND REGULATION OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 263, 268 (Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Heather K.
Gerken & Michael S. Kang eds., 2011).
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III. THE PLACE OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY IN ELECTION LAW
As election law has moved from a purely rights-based approach towards a
more structural viewpoint, it has become more obvious than ever before that
there has to be a clear, more explicit consideration of the democratic goals
underlying reform proposals.20 Political reform aims to achieve democratic
improvement. Clarifying what goals these proposals are meant to achieve is an
important step in truly improving the U.S. political system. It is important to
expose students not only to fundamental democratic theory, but also to the
intermediate theories that fill in the gaps of the democratic architecture.
Given the demands of working in the cases as well as the empirical studies,
it is hard to give this subject its due consideration. I have used Robert Dahl’s
A Preface to Democratic Theory21 as one of the initial readings because it
makes two important points that apply to reform: first, that the critical feature
of any democratic state is the opportunity for a free election in which voters
can choose between at least two candidates or party slates.22 Not only does
this give the students a sense of what is absolutely fundamental to all
democracies, but it also shows that the basic architecture of a democracy is
quite bare. Lots of the other varied features in different democracies—whether
to have political parties, how to count ballots and decide winners, the level of
transparency, whether to give voters an initiative option, and the like—are all
equally compatible with the basic requirements of a democracy.
This is important because there is a tendency in all of us to think that the
reform we prefer will make the system “more democratic.” A few years ago, a
number of political scientists and legal scholars were vigorously advocating for
multiparty systems and proportional representation rules, suggesting that more
choice equaled more democracy.23 Having more than two parties or candidates
on a ballot might indeed be a welcome change in America today at some or all
levels of government, but it does not make the system more democratic. It
simply replaces one form of democracy with another, each with its advantages
and disadvantages.
This leads to a second point: that many of the various theories about
representation are what have been called “intermediate democratic theories.”24
Dahl himself contrasts two very important variations in his seminal book. One
is the Madisonian strand that divides power and blends the perspectives of the

20. For further discussion, see id.
21. ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (expanded ed., 2006).
22. See id. at 3 (“But at a minimum . . . democratic theory is concerned with processes by
which ordinary citizens exert a relatively high level of control over their leaders.”).
23. See, e.g., DOUGLAS J. AMY, REAL CHOICES/NEW VOICES: HOW PROPORTIONAL
REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS COULD REVITALIZE DEMOCRACY (2d ed. 2002).
24. A term I borrow from Daniel H. Lowenstein. See Daniel H. Lowenstein, Political
Bribery and the Intermediate Theory of Politics, 32 UCLA L. REV. 784, 784–85 (1985).
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majority and minority.25 The other is populism that privileges the majority at
all stages of democratic design.26 This distinction is very helpful in
understanding why equally well-intentioned reformers might disagree about
what they are trying to do. There are ongoing, non-terminating debates about
the relative merits of representative versus direct democracy, delegate versus
trustee forms of representation, deliberative versus market-based competition
and the like. The challenge is how to expose students to these various
variations within the confines of a one semester course. My preference has
been to give them an overview lecture on this topic rather than try to assign
lots of additional readings. But my overriding point is that given the normative
and policy orientation of the election law field, I have always made it a priority
to include a segment on democratic theory about reform goal considerations to
provide a context for what is being contested in the courts.
IV. TEACHING ELECTION LAW
It is not just inevitable, but quite possibly a good thing, that Election Law
is taught in different ways. A class itself often has different purposes given the
different expectations and backgrounds of the students. Some might be
looking to make this their career focus while others are just sampling out of
casual interest. The political scientist is naturally going to put Election Law in
a broader political context than law professors who are trying to give students
vocational skills and background. Going forward, I would hope that some of
this material filters down into undergraduate education, because in the end,
voters directly or indirectly make the choices about political reform that
sometimes end up in the courts.

25. See DAHL, supra note 21, at 4.
26. See id. at 34–35.
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